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We study the emergence of objective properties in open quantum systems. In our analysis, the
environment is promoted from a passive role of reservoir selectively destroying quantum coherence, to
an active role of amplifier selectively proliferating information about the system. We show that only
preferred pointer states of the system can leave a redundant and therefore easily detectable imprint on
the environment. Observers who—as it is almost always the case—discover the state of the system
indirectly (by probing a fraction of its environment) will find out only about the corresponding
pointer observable. Many observers can act in this fashion independently and without perturbing
the system: they will agree about the state of the system. In this operational sense, preferred pointer
states exist objectively.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Yz, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a
The key feature distinguishing the classical realm from
the quantum substrate is its objective existence. Classi-
cal states can be found out through measurements by
an initially ignorant observer without getting disrupted
in the process. By contrast, an attempt to discover the
state of a quantum system through a direct measurement
generally leads to a collapse [1, 2, 3]: after a measure-
ment, the state will be what the observer finds out it is,
but not—in general—what it was before. Thus, it is dif-
ficult to claim that quantum states exist objectively in
the same sense as their classical counterparts [4, 5, 6].
It is by now widely appreciated that decoherence,
caused by persistent monitoring of a system by the en-
vironment, can single out a preferred set of states. In
simplest models, such pointer states [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] are
(often degenerate) eigenstates of the pointer observable
which commutes with the system-environment interac-
tion [12]. This concept can be generalized using the pre-
dictability sieve: only pointer states evolve predictably in
spite of the openness of the system [7, 10, 11]. They exist
in the sense that in absence of any perturbations—save
for the monitoring by the environment—they or their dy-
namically evolved descendants will continue to faithfully
describe the system. Thus, when an observer knows what
are the pointer states, he can learn which of them repre-
sents the system without perturbing it. However, when
an observer ignorant of what pointer states are attempts
to find out the state of the system directly, he still faces,
even in the presence of decoherence, the danger of col-
lapsing its wave packet.
Here, we build on the idea that a direct measurement
of the system is not how observers gather data about
the Universe: rather, a vast majority (if not all) of our
information is obtained indirectly by probing a small frac-
tion of the environment [7, 9, 11]. One may think that
this twist in the story can be accounted for by adding
a few links to the von Neumann chain [2], but this is
not the case: we shall show that the monitoring environ-
ment acquires information about the system selectively.
More importantly, this selective spreading of information
through the environment—in essence “quantum Darwin-
ism” [11]—accounts for the objective existence of some
preferred quantum states: by probing the system indi-
rectly, hence without perturbing it, many independent
observers can obtain reliable information, but only about
the pointer states.
This letter is organized as follows: first, we introduce
our operational definition of objectivity. We then state
necessary and sufficient conditions for the objective ex-
istence of an observable in the context of einselection
(environment-induced superselection). Next, these re-
quirements are translated into an information theoretic
framework, and proven to imply a unique observable: the
usual pointer observable. This is our key result. Finally,
we show that, because of quantum Darwinism, informa-
tion about pointer states is robust and, hence, objective.
An operational definition of objectivity for a property
of a quantum system should not rely on pre-existence of
an underlying reality as it is presumed in the classical
setting. Rather, we demand that an objective property
of the system of interest should be
(i ) simultaneously accessible to many observers,
(ii ) who should be able to find out what it is without
prior knowledge and
(iii ) who should arrive at a consensus about it without
prior agreement.
As we already mentioned, the collapse of the wave packet
following a direct measurement generally precludes this.
However, when the system of interest S interacts with
an environment E composed of many subsystems, E =⊗N
k=1 Ek, the situation changes dramatically. When a
property leaves a complete and redundant imprint on
the environment, all three criteria are satisfied: many
copies are available, hence simultaneous accessibility (i )
2is straightforward. Moreover fractions of the environ-
ment can be measured without perturbing either S or
the rest of E . Therefore, ignorant observers can vary their
measurements independently, corroborate their own re-
sults and arrive at a common description of properties of
the system. Hence, owing to redundancy, prior knowl-
edge (ii) is not necessary to (iii) reach consensus. The
existence of an objective property requires the presence
of its complete and redundant imprint in the environment
as necessary and sufficient conditions. Our approach will
focus on the study of the correlations between parts of
the environment and the system of interest.
Information theoretical framework. A natural way to
characterize such correlations is to use the mutual infor-
mation I(σ : e) between an observable σ of S and a mea-
surement e on E . In short, I(σ : e) measures one’s ability
to predict the outcome of measurement σ on S after hav-
ing “looked at the environment” through e. For a given
density matrix ρSE of S ⊗ E , the measurement results
are random variables characterized by a joint probability
distribution
p(σi, ej) = Tr{(σi ⊗ ej)ρ
SE}, (1)
where σi and ej are the spectral projectors of observ-
ables σ and e. By definition, the mutual information is
the difference between the initially missing information
about σ and the remaining uncertainty about σ when
e is known [13]. Using Shannon entropy as a measure
of missing information, H(σ) = −
∑
i p(σi) log p(σi) and
H(σ, e) = −
∑
i,j p(σi, ej) log p(σi, ej), the mutual infor-
mation is
I(σ : e) = H(σ) +H(e)−H(σ, e). (2)
The information about observable σ of S that can be
optimally extracted from m environmental subsystems is
Iˆm(σ) = max
{e∈Mm}
I(σ : e) (3)
where Mm is the set of all measurements on those m
subsystems. In general, Iˆm(σ) will depend on which par-
ticular m subsystems are considered. For simplicity, we
will assume that any typical m environmental subsystems
yield roughly the same information. This may appear to
be a strong assumption, but, as we discuss bellow, relax-
ing it does not affect our main conclusions. By setting
m to the total number N of subsystems of E , we get the
information content of the entire environment. Then,
IˆN (σ) ≈ H(σ) (4)
expresses the completeness prerequisite for objectivity:
all (or nearly all) missing information about σ must be
in principle obtainable from all of E .
However, as a consequence of basis ambiguity [12, 14],
information about many observables σ can be deduced by
an appropriate measurement on the entire environment.
Therefore, completeness, Eq. (4), while a prerequisite for
objectivity, is not a very selective criterion (see Fig. 1a
for illustration). To claim objectivity, it is not sufficient
to have a complete imprint of the candidate property
of S in the environment. There must be many copies of
this imprint that can be accessed independently by many
observers: information must be redundant.
Redundancy and its consequences. To obtain a mea-
sure of redundancy, one must count the number of copies
of the information about σ present in E . Redundancy
is thus quantified by the number of disjoint subsets of E
containing almost all—all but a fraction δ—of the infor-
mation about σ available from the entire E :
Rδ(σ) = N/mδ(σ). (5)
Above mδ(σ) is the smallest number m of typical envi-
ronmental subsystems that contain almost all the infor-
mation about σ, i.e. Iˆm(σ) ≥ (1− δ)IˆN (σ)).
The key question now is: What is the structure of
the set O of observables that are completely, IN (σ) ≈
H(σ), and redundantly, Rδ(σ) ≫ 1 with δ ≪ 1, im-
printed on the environment? The answer is provided by
the following theorem.
Theorem: The set O is characterized by a unique ob-
servable pi, called by definition the maximally refined
observable: the information Iˆm(σ) about any observ-
able σ in O obtainable from a fraction of E is equivalent
to the information about σ that can be obtained through
its correlations with the maximally refined observable pi:
Iˆm(σ) = I(σ : pi) (6)
for mδ(pi) ≤ m≪ N .
Outline of the proof for perfect records, δ = 0. Let
σ(1) and σ(2) be two observables in O for δ = 0. Since
σ(1) and σ(2) can be inferred from two disjoint fragments
of E , they must commute. Similarly, let e(1) (resp. e(2))
be a measurement acting on a fragment of E that re-
veals all the information about σ(1) (resp. σ(2)) while
causing minimum disturbance to ρSE . Then, e(1) and
e(2) commute, and can thus be measured simultaneously.
This combined measurement gives complete information
about σ(1) and σ(2). Hence, for any pair of observables in
O, it is possible to find a more refined observable which
is also in O. The maximally refined observable pi is then
obtained by pairing successively all the observables in O.
By construction pi satisfies Eq. (6) for any σ in O.
Note that the Theorem does not guarantee the exis-
tence of a non trivial observable pi: when the system
does not properly correlate with E , the set O will only
contain the identity operator.
In fact, this Theorem can be extended to nearly per-
fect records for assumptions satisfied by usual models
of decoherence [15]. The proof is based on the recogni-
tion that only the already familiar pointer observable can
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FIG. 1: Quantum Darwinism can be illustrated using a model introduced in [12]. The system S , a spin- 1
2
particle, interacts with
N = 50 two-dimensional subsystems of the environment through HˆSE =
∑N
k=1
gkσ
S
z ⊗σ
Ek
y for a time t. The initial state of S⊗E
is 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉)⊗|0〉E1⊗. . .⊗|0〉EN . All the plotted quantities are function of the system’s observable σ(µ) = cos(µ)σz+sin(µ)σx,
where µ is the angle between its eigenstates and the pointer states of S—here the eigenstates of σSz . a) Information acquired
by the optimal measurement e on the whole environment, IˆN(σ), as a function of the inferred observable σ(µ) and the action
ak = gkt = a for all k. A large amount of information is accessible in the whole environment for any observables σ(µ) except
when the interaction action ak is very small. Thus, complete imprinting of an observable of S in E is not sufficient to claim
objectivity. b) Redundancy of the information about the system as a function of the inferred observable σ(µ) and the action
ak = gkt = a. It is measured by Rδ=0.1(σ), which counts the number of times 90% of the total information can be “read
off” independently by measuring distinct fragments of the environment. For all values of the action ak = gkt = a, redundant
imprinting is sharply peaked around the pointer observable. Redundancy is a very selective criterion. The number of copies
of relevant information is high only for the observables σ(µ) falling inside the theoretical bound (see text) indicated by the
dashed line. c) Information about σ(µ) extracted by an observer restricted to local random measurements on m environmental
subsystems (e.g. e = eE1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ eEm where each eEk is chosen at random). The interaction action ak = gkt is randomly
chosen in [0, pi/4] for each k. Because of redundancy, pointer states—and only pointer states—can be found out through this
far-from-optimal measurement strategy. Information about any other observable σ(µ) is restricted by our theorem to be equal
to the information brought about it by the pointer observable σSz , Eq. (6).
have a redundant and robust imprint on E . The Theorem
can be understood as a consequence of the ability of the
pointer states to persist while immersed in the environ-
ment. This resilience allows the information about the
pointer observables to proliferate, very much in the spirit
of the “survival of the fittest”.
Two important consequences of this theorem follow.
(i ) An observer who probes only a fraction of the envi-
ronment is able to find out the state of the system as if
he measured pi on S. (ii ) Information about any other
observable σ of S will be inevitably limited by the avail-
able correlations existing between σ and pi. In essence,
our theorem proves the uniqueness of redundant infor-
mation, and therefore the selectivity of its proliferation.
Quantum Darwinism—the idea that the perceived
classical reality is a consequence of the selective prolif-
eration of information about the system [11]—is consis-
tent with previous approaches to einselection, such as
the predictability sieve, but goes beyond them. The ex-
istence of redundant information about the system, in-
duced by specific interactions with the environment, com-
pletely defines what kind and how information can be
retrieved from E : Eq. (6) shows that the most efficient
strategy for inferring σ consists in estimating pi first, and
deducing from it information about σ. It also explains
the emergence of a consensus about the properties of a
system. Observers that gain information about pi—the
only kind of information available in fragments of E—will
agree about their conclusions: their measurement results
are directly correlated with pi, and are therefore corre-
lated with each other. Hence, observers probing frac-
tions of the environment can act as if the system had
a state of its own—an objective state (one of the eigen-
states of pi). By contrast, such consensus cannot arise
for superpositions of pointer states, e.g. Schro¨dinger cats,
since information about them can only be extracted by
probing the whole environment, and thus cannot be ob-
tained independently by several observers. Objectivity
comes at the price of singling out a preferred observable
of S whose eigenstates are redundantly recorded in E .
Cloning of quanta is not possible [16], but amplification
of a preferred observable happens almost as inevitably as
decoherence, and leads to objective classical reality. The
impossibility of cloning and the capacity for amplification
imply selection—Darwinian “survival of the fittest”.
Emergence of objectivity exemplified. In Figure 1b, we
show for a specific model the redundancy, Rδ=0.1, as a
function of the inferred observable σ(µ) (whose eigen-
states are tilted by an angle µ from the pointer ones)
and of the interaction action, ak = gkt (sin(ak) charac-
terizes the strength of the correlations between S and
Ek). By carefully tracking all orders of δ in Eq. (6), one
can show that the existence of a complete and redundant
imprint of observable σ(µ) in the environment requires
H2(cos
2 µ
2 ) ≤ δ, where H2(p) = −[p log p+(1−p) log(1−
p)]. Inserting the actual values of the parameters chosen
4for our simulation, the above equation indicates that only
observables with |µ| < 0.23 leave a redundant imprint on
the environment: the objective properties of the system
are unique. This bound is in excellent agreement with
our numerical results. Surprisingly, and as confirmed by
our simulation, the interaction action ak only plays a role
in setting the value of the redundancy at its maximum,
but does not affect the selectivity of our criterion. Which
observable becomes objective is largely decided by the
structure of the interaction Hamiltonian, (i.e. the set of
pointer states), but not by its details such as strength and
duration of the interaction. This ensures the stability of
the pointer observable deduced from redundancy.
Robustness of information. Objective information
must be extractable through “realizable”—hence, not
necessarily optimal—measurements for many observers
to arrive at an operational consensus about the state of
a system. For instance, human eyes can only measure
photons separately, yet we can still learn about the po-
sition of objects. This issue is considered for our model
in Fig. 1c. Here, even local (i.e. spin by spin) random
measurements eventually acquire the entire information
available in E about the pointer states. Though surpris-
ing, this result naturally follows from quantum Darwin-
ism and the fact that high redundancy protects informa-
tion against a wide range of errors. Almost any observ-
able of S is completely imprinted on the environment (see
Fig. 1a). However, as our theorem establishes and Fig. 1b
illustrates, only the observables which are “close” to the
maximally refined pointer observable pi = σSz , can be im-
printed redundantly in the environment. Therefore only
information about pointer states can tolerate errors, i.e.
can be extracted by non-optimal measurements. In short,
not only is the information about the pointer observable
easy to extract from fragments of the environment, it is
impossible to ignore!
Clearly, for the emergence of objective properties, it is
much more important to know that Rδ(σ) ≫ 1 than to
know its precise value: the whole idea of redundancy is
that it allows one to be sloppy in decoding the message
and still “get it right”. This is our proposed explana-
tion for the robustness of the classical. Thus, the essence
of our conclusions is unaffected by the assumption (see
Eq. (3)) of even spreading of information in the environ-
ment: our result depends only on the existence of multi-
ple records of the same information in disjoint fragments
of the environment, not on what these fragments are.
Similarly, Rδ(σ) depends on the tensor product of E
into subsystems, which is a priori arbitrary. However,
several considerations suggest locality as guide line for
the definition of elementary subsystems. For instance,
our access to the information content of the environment
is restricted by the fundamental Hamiltonians of nature
which are local. Moreover, various observers occupy, and
therefore monitor, different spatial regions. Hence, an op-
erational notion of redundancy should reflect spreading
of information in space. Again, details of the partition
are not important as we are only interested in the typical
behavior of redundancy. These issues will be discussed
in more details in a forthcoming paper [15].
Quantum Darwinism capitalizes on some ideas that
arose in the context of decoherence and einselection,
but goes beyond them in an essential fashion. Exis-
tence of records in the environment has been noted be-
fore [7, 8, 9, 17], and the fact that it is easiest to find
out about the pointer observable has been also appre-
ciated [18]. Here, however, we have described an even
more dramatic turn of events—environment as a broad-
cast medium— which may seem fanciful until we real-
ize that it describes rather accurately what happens in
the real world. For instance, human observers acquire
all of their visual data by intercepting a small fraction
of their photon environment. An operational notion of
objectivity emerges from redundant information as it en-
ables many independent observers to find out the state
of the system without disturbing it. Furthermore, objec-
tive observables are robust—insensitive to changes in the
strategy through which the environment is interrogated,
as well as to variations of the strength and duration of
the interaction between S and E , etc. One might regard
quantum Darwinism as a fully quantum implementation
of Bohr’s idea [19] about the role of amplification in the
transition from quantum to classical.
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